[This is from Carina.]
1. The fourth chapter of Vives' discussion of young women's education makes several assertions about the moral character of knowledge--perhaps about the correspondence or lack thereof between language and truth. Vives clearly wishes to argue that knowledge is, in point of fact, a moral force, and to suggest that educating women will moralize them: "It would be to our
advantage to have at least a knowledge of good to protect us from the constant onslaught of evil ... when [your daughter] is assailed by vice, to which she has grow accustomed, what protection will be afforded by moral rectitude, which she never came to know?" (19-20). Vives argues that women need education in goodness to protect them from sin. He writes, "The woman who has learned to make 'reflections' will never bring herself to commit any vile act, for her mind will have been strengthened and imbued with holy counsels" (21).
But the difficulty in this position derives from that fact that it is, in Vives' observation, entirely possible to learn evil and not good. Therefore, learning cannot be said to be an absolutely positive moral force. In order to resolve this dilemma, Vives defines only certain applications of the intellect as knowledge, excluding others. Those that count as learning are: "the study of wisdom," "books that impart instruction in morals," and "that part of philosophy that has assumed as its task the formation and improvement of morals" (28-29). Those that are not included: "idle verses or vain and frivolous ditties," and "eloquence," which in abeyance to Paul his Christian woman will have no need of. By this judgment or division, Vives makes a one-to-one correlation between knowledge and truth--where truth is revealed and is thus also perfectly moral--possible.
2. Religious Humanism strikes me as an attempt to reconcile the issue of where truth comes from. The "religious" part of the movement has to locate truth in scripture, which is divine and above question, or beyond logic. "Humanism" complicates this, because it values individual reason, the kind of knowledge that is discovered. A Religious Humanist work has to walk a tightrope between the two, and I suspect that that tension drives a lot of the philosophy.
Sor Juana defers to scripture as fundamental truth, but she approaches it with more logic than reverence. She's trying to understand it, not merely to accept it, and she finds her reading of the text to be in disagreement at times with the Church. Vives seems to me to be much more reliant on the more image-driven or mythological parts of the bible--note his references to the devil. He goes into discourse with many assumptions as to the universal characteristics of women as a group, and does not reveal his reasoning for accepting them. Several times, as with the Pauline rule against women's speech, he seems to struggle with them. They are, perhaps, pieces of implicit knowledge. Erasmus looks to the learned traditions of both the Church and of the Classics, but he seems to take them not on faith but on persuasion. Erasmus also gives a great deal of power to the listener/reader in their own persuasion through his dominant image of "richness." Could we
say that Erasmus locates truth in the process of discourse?
30 September 2009
On Vives, Cruz, and Pizan
1) From the start of Chapter IV, Vives is clearly arguing for a knowledge of good. He laments: "Would that it were possible to lead our lives in the midst of so many evil people and remain ignorant of evil" (63). So "evil," as he explains earlier, is not something we need bother to teach. Evil will out. It's knowledge of the good, apparently, that deserves our extra attention if we are to be protected from "the constant onslaught of evil" (63). For Vives, education (the right sort, of course) has the capacity to strengthen our minds and "imbue" them with "holy counsels" (65), so as to resist the temptations of evil. Indeed, as he so pointedly remarks, "You will not easily find an evil woman unless she be one who is ignorant..." (65). Let this be a lesson to us, friends.
2) De la Cruz, like Vives, seems to identify a relationship between education and goodness, her primary goal being to "study, so as to become less ignorant" (788). Her writing (and perhaps even her life) suggest a virtuousness to learning, which, were we to use her "Respuesta" to historicize religious humanism, indicates that this movement may be characterized by such a link. Pizan, on the other hand, while certainly identifying the role of morality in courtly life, conflates many of these moral standards with women (e.g. compassion, pity, humility) rather than women's education. While in "City of Ladies" she certainly advocates for the education of women, this opportunity is framed always as having the encouragement and patronage of men (e.g. learned fathers). Many women would certainly have to strive to maintain these mores, as suggested by her recommendation that one avoid gossiping, etc., but one does not seem to need an education to be moral.
2) De la Cruz, like Vives, seems to identify a relationship between education and goodness, her primary goal being to "study, so as to become less ignorant" (788). Her writing (and perhaps even her life) suggest a virtuousness to learning, which, were we to use her "Respuesta" to historicize religious humanism, indicates that this movement may be characterized by such a link. Pizan, on the other hand, while certainly identifying the role of morality in courtly life, conflates many of these moral standards with women (e.g. compassion, pity, humility) rather than women's education. While in "City of Ladies" she certainly advocates for the education of women, this opportunity is framed always as having the encouragement and patronage of men (e.g. learned fathers). Many women would certainly have to strive to maintain these mores, as suggested by her recommendation that one avoid gossiping, etc., but one does not seem to need an education to be moral.
Vives' Concept of Moral Education
Hi All,
I took Vives' concept of moral education and ran with:
“[L]et her begin by learning things that contribute to the cultivation of the mind and the care and management of the home” (58).
Women’s education is vital the well being of the state, since Vives views education more narrowly as “moral education” in two different senses. First, education can be used as a direct moralizing force, teaching women what is right and how to act properly: “The learning that I should wish to be made available to the whole human race is sober and chaste; it forms our character and renders us better” (64.
Second, education can confer skills that contribute to an overall good, mostly in domestic management. The moral health of the state is reflected in the moral health of the household. An example of this is Vives’ stern espousal that women learn to cook well:
“cooking, for it is an art of great necessity” (61)…”And I have come to the conclusion that the principal reason why men here in Belgium spend so much time in inns and taverns is the negligence and laziness of their women in cooking meals, which forces me to avoid their own homes and seek elsewhere what they do not find there” (62).
What we see is that cooking, while itself a skill and not a form of moral instruction, has a moral result of creating a sustainable household by keeping men out of inns and taverns. A “steadfast and chaste” (70) woman must, according to Vives, both be instructed in moral behavior and skilled in tasks with positive moral results.
I took Vives' concept of moral education and ran with:
“[L]et her begin by learning things that contribute to the cultivation of the mind and the care and management of the home” (58).
Women’s education is vital the well being of the state, since Vives views education more narrowly as “moral education” in two different senses. First, education can be used as a direct moralizing force, teaching women what is right and how to act properly: “The learning that I should wish to be made available to the whole human race is sober and chaste; it forms our character and renders us better” (64.
Second, education can confer skills that contribute to an overall good, mostly in domestic management. The moral health of the state is reflected in the moral health of the household. An example of this is Vives’ stern espousal that women learn to cook well:
“cooking, for it is an art of great necessity” (61)…”And I have come to the conclusion that the principal reason why men here in Belgium spend so much time in inns and taverns is the negligence and laziness of their women in cooking meals, which forces me to avoid their own homes and seek elsewhere what they do not find there” (62).
What we see is that cooking, while itself a skill and not a form of moral instruction, has a moral result of creating a sustainable household by keeping men out of inns and taverns. A “steadfast and chaste” (70) woman must, according to Vives, both be instructed in moral behavior and skilled in tasks with positive moral results.
29 September 2009
Mary's Mini-trace
Here are my responses to Vives, de la Cruz, and Pizan.
#1 In the third chapter of Vives' book, I see several passages that suggest that women's education is beneficial to the State and that education ought to be available to women of all social classes:
a)Vives praises several well-known women, ancient and contemporary, for their diligence and skill in spinning, weaving, and needlework: Hannah (Samuel's mother), Penelope, the Macedonian queens, Queen Isabella of Spain, and Catherine of Aragon. By commending these aristocratic women for mastering an accomplishment that some might consider plebian, Vives implies that education (in textile work, at least) should be available to both upper and lower-class women.
b)In advocating the study of cooking, Vives blames Belgian men's fondness for taverns on the "negligence and laziness of their women in cooking meals." Hence, Vives suggests that women's ignorance of cooking can contribute to men's laziness and neglect of their families, and, indirectly, to the instability of the nation.
#2 In the writings of Pizan and de la Cruz, much of the speaker's authority comes from repeated appeals to scriptural passages and to prominent church authorities--both well-known figures such as Jerome (B/H 786) and the generic "mistress's confessor" (B/H 550). The salient difference is in the uses the two authors make of the evidence. While Pizan uses Biblical evidence unquestioningly to reinforce truths widely accepted ("By long forbearing is a prince persuaded"; "Love thy neighbor as thyself,") de la Cruz encourages her readers to approach the Scriptures more critically--not to challenge the infallibility of the Bible itself, but to inquire into the cultural contexts in which its authors wrote, and, if necessary, to challenge common interpretations.
#1 In the third chapter of Vives' book, I see several passages that suggest that women's education is beneficial to the State and that education ought to be available to women of all social classes:
a)Vives praises several well-known women, ancient and contemporary, for their diligence and skill in spinning, weaving, and needlework: Hannah (Samuel's mother), Penelope, the Macedonian queens, Queen Isabella of Spain, and Catherine of Aragon. By commending these aristocratic women for mastering an accomplishment that some might consider plebian, Vives implies that education (in textile work, at least) should be available to both upper and lower-class women.
b)In advocating the study of cooking, Vives blames Belgian men's fondness for taverns on the "negligence and laziness of their women in cooking meals." Hence, Vives suggests that women's ignorance of cooking can contribute to men's laziness and neglect of their families, and, indirectly, to the instability of the nation.
#2 In the writings of Pizan and de la Cruz, much of the speaker's authority comes from repeated appeals to scriptural passages and to prominent church authorities--both well-known figures such as Jerome (B/H 786) and the generic "mistress's confessor" (B/H 550). The salient difference is in the uses the two authors make of the evidence. While Pizan uses Biblical evidence unquestioningly to reinforce truths widely accepted ("By long forbearing is a prince persuaded"; "Love thy neighbor as thyself,") de la Cruz encourages her readers to approach the Scriptures more critically--not to challenge the infallibility of the Bible itself, but to inquire into the cultural contexts in which its authors wrote, and, if necessary, to challenge common interpretations.
Religious Humanism: a mini-trace and a synthesis
Hello, everyone.
Here are the two activities we did not get to during Thursday's class discussion (9/24) on Vives and de la Cruz. I'd say, tackle them as if you would have tackled them while we were in class--focusedly, but briefly. You need not write a lengthy exposition in response to each question; just get yourself to a point of realization, and share that realization with us.
1) This is how Fantazzi--the editor of Vives' Education of a Christian Woman--generally characterizes this rhetorical treatise and some of Vives' other training manuals for women pupils (Fantazzi, "Introduction" 1-40):
--advocated education for all women regardless of social class and ability
--argued that women were intellectually equal if not superior to men
--promoted universal education of women, even those who showed no natural aptitude for learning
--argued that women's proper education was essential to the well-being of the state
--distinguished between real “learning” and superficial belletristic knowledge
--argued that ignorance (not knowledge) fostered evil
What evidence can you find for one or more of these arguments in the following? (Select only one option below for your mini-trace.) How consistently is it argued?
Chapters I-III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
2) Let's say we had only two ways to historicize and understand "religious humanism" as a movement:
--noting differences between Pizan and de la Cruz in terms of textual features, how writers establish authority, key claims and assumptions, and what counts as evidence
--taking Erasmus, Vives, and de la Cruz as a collective and explaining how they could represent the same tradition in terms of the above
Pick one of these two ways and offer a brief historicization of your own.
Good luck and have fun with this.
-Tarez
Here are the two activities we did not get to during Thursday's class discussion (9/24) on Vives and de la Cruz. I'd say, tackle them as if you would have tackled them while we were in class--focusedly, but briefly. You need not write a lengthy exposition in response to each question; just get yourself to a point of realization, and share that realization with us.
1) This is how Fantazzi--the editor of Vives' Education of a Christian Woman--generally characterizes this rhetorical treatise and some of Vives' other training manuals for women pupils (Fantazzi, "Introduction" 1-40):
--advocated education for all women regardless of social class and ability
--argued that women were intellectually equal if not superior to men
--promoted universal education of women, even those who showed no natural aptitude for learning
--argued that women's proper education was essential to the well-being of the state
--distinguished between real “learning” and superficial belletristic knowledge
--argued that ignorance (not knowledge) fostered evil
What evidence can you find for one or more of these arguments in the following? (Select only one option below for your mini-trace.) How consistently is it argued?
Chapters I-III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
2) Let's say we had only two ways to historicize and understand "religious humanism" as a movement:
--noting differences between Pizan and de la Cruz in terms of textual features, how writers establish authority, key claims and assumptions, and what counts as evidence
--taking Erasmus, Vives, and de la Cruz as a collective and explaining how they could represent the same tradition in terms of the above
Pick one of these two ways and offer a brief historicization of your own.
Good luck and have fun with this.
-Tarez
27 September 2009
Promised quasi-etymology from Augustine Bk. IV
Jeff and others, here is the etymology I promised.
I was at first inclined to post this in response to Jeff's question about the role of predestination in Augustine's Book IV, but it would have made a lengthy and insufficient response; as well, I didn't want to steer that conversation in a direction unintended by Jeff.
Circuitus
In Sister Sullivan's translation in B/H this appears simply as "period", which offers a somewhat misleading interpretation of Greek periodos. What I'll show below is a quasi-development of two terms simultaneously: periodos and ambitus, since both had in some way influenced Augustine's use of circuitus in Book IV.
1) Greek peri-hodos (“around”-“a going, way, journey”)
2) Greek periodos
3) Latin circuit / ambit ("going around")
3) Latin periodos "complete cycle"
5) Augustine circuitus (via Quintilian)
For Augustine: two or more membra where the rhythm is suspended/held at the end of each phrase except on the last phrase. The introduction to D.W. Robertson's translation helped me discern this. Robertson notes that Sullivan's translation tends to replace the oral convention (for which we have no modern-day equivalent in English) with the closest equivalent in written punctuation. This is not altogether inaccurate, given that we will likely see some conventions from medieval oral delivery as having been transferred onto the punctuation mark that denotes them in written discourse.
Membra
For Augustine: a membrum contains a complete meaning and complete rhythm by itself, but not when it is considered in relation to the whole sentence (Robertson xix). Again, the introduction to Robertson's translation helped me discern this. Previously, I had equated membrum with something like "independent clause," probably because I was always looking to the written translation of Augustine's examples to try to understand the convention. (Duh.) Sullivan notes the Greek kola as membra's earliest origin.
Caesa
As above, I'll try to show a quasi-development of two terms, kommata and caesellum, since both had in some way influenced Augustine's use of caesa in Book IV, although this is by no means an authoritative trace! Sullivan and Robertson note the Greek kommata as caesa's earliest origin.
1) Greek kommata ("pieces which are cut off")
2) Latin caesellum (dim. of caesus "to have cut")
3) Latin cisellum (vernacular use for "cutting tool")
4) Augustine caesum / incisum (via Quintilian)
For Augustine, this was an expression that contains a complete meaning but is delivered with a suspended rhythm (perhaps to denote exchange, invite completion, suggest reciprocity?).
-Tarez
I was at first inclined to post this in response to Jeff's question about the role of predestination in Augustine's Book IV, but it would have made a lengthy and insufficient response; as well, I didn't want to steer that conversation in a direction unintended by Jeff.
Circuitus
In Sister Sullivan's translation in B/H this appears simply as "period", which offers a somewhat misleading interpretation of Greek periodos. What I'll show below is a quasi-development of two terms simultaneously: periodos and ambitus, since both had in some way influenced Augustine's use of circuitus in Book IV.
1) Greek peri-hodos (“around”-“a going, way, journey”)
2) Greek periodos
3) Latin circuit / ambit ("going around")
3) Latin periodos "complete cycle"
5) Augustine circuitus (via Quintilian)
For Augustine: two or more membra where the rhythm is suspended/held at the end of each phrase except on the last phrase. The introduction to D.W. Robertson's translation helped me discern this. Robertson notes that Sullivan's translation tends to replace the oral convention (for which we have no modern-day equivalent in English) with the closest equivalent in written punctuation. This is not altogether inaccurate, given that we will likely see some conventions from medieval oral delivery as having been transferred onto the punctuation mark that denotes them in written discourse.
Membra
For Augustine: a membrum contains a complete meaning and complete rhythm by itself, but not when it is considered in relation to the whole sentence (Robertson xix). Again, the introduction to Robertson's translation helped me discern this. Previously, I had equated membrum with something like "independent clause," probably because I was always looking to the written translation of Augustine's examples to try to understand the convention. (Duh.) Sullivan notes the Greek kola as membra's earliest origin.
Caesa
As above, I'll try to show a quasi-development of two terms, kommata and caesellum, since both had in some way influenced Augustine's use of caesa in Book IV, although this is by no means an authoritative trace! Sullivan and Robertson note the Greek kommata as caesa's earliest origin.
1) Greek kommata ("pieces which are cut off")
2) Latin caesellum (dim. of caesus "to have cut")
3) Latin cisellum (vernacular use for "cutting tool")
4) Augustine caesum / incisum (via Quintilian)
For Augustine, this was an expression that contains a complete meaning but is delivered with a suspended rhythm (perhaps to denote exchange, invite completion, suggest reciprocity?).
-Tarez
22 September 2009
City of Ladies and Other Cities
Just a few thoughts: It recently (as in 2 minutes ago) came to my attention that Augustine wrote "The City of God," in which there are two opposing cities, the City of God and the City of Man (City of the World?). While I know virtually none of the specifics, it seems clear that Christine de Pizan was echoing and responding to a kind of conversation here, or even echoing a textual/rhetorical tradition. Apparently de Pizan's City of Ladies is construed as a more redemptive, restorative site, as opposed the depraved and sinful City of Man posed by Augustine, but it does make me wonder what we've missed in our BH-selected Augustinian readings... And while I know we've moved on to Erasmus and others, I suppose it wouldn't hurt to continue considering the extent to which these rhetors (the women, especially) are complicating and re-appropriating dominant discourses and formations.
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