(Sorry, I originally had this posted in the comments section)
Vico, Question no. 2:Vico does not seem to believe that we can go to language to find cultural and sociological theories. In his mind, these are cannot be contained within reason. He argues that "young men, because of their training, which is focused on these studies, are unable to engage in the life of the community, to conduct themselves with sufficient wisdom and prudence; nor can they infuse speech with a familiarity with human psychology or permeate their utterances with passion" (871). This suggests that language is limited. He suggests, in saying they cannot "permeate their utterances with passion," that language alone is not capable of representing truths. Instead, truths come from the people; truths are not established by the language of the rhetor, but rather adopted to the audience.
Vico seems to feel that language does not create truths, but adapts itself to truth. "He argues that it is "impossible to assess human affairs by the inflexible standard of abstract right; we must rather gauge them by the pliant Lesbic rule, which does not conform bodies to itself, but adjusts itself to their contours" (871). Thus sign systems are abitrary in the sense that they can never be stable of fixed; sign systems must be adapted to different means.
In a respect, Vico does see eloquence and rhetoric as a threat to probability and inquiry. He claims that "eloquence does not address itself to the rational part of our nature, but almost entirely to our passions" (873). But unlike Bacon, I don't believe that this a bad thing, for language alone cannot completely affect persausion, as the above discussion shows.
[Jon Booth to continue this discourse]
Locke, Language is imperfect:
Learning (29)
Perception (20)
Sensation (26)
"There were philosophers who had LEARNING and subtility enough to prove. . . that White was Black."
Here Locke suggests that learning can act to manipulate language. Language is thus imperfect in the sense that learning allows it to be used to distort the truth.
"We may define the term whiteness as the power of exciting in us the sensation of white. We cannot define the name of the simple feeling itself."
Language has the power to signify a sensation, but it is powerless to truly represent that feeling. What we feel and what we use to express are, in this respect, arbitrary and futile. Language is imperfect in that true feelings and sensations cannot be captured in language. As he says in Chapter IX, "sounds have no natural connection with our ideas, but have all their signfication from the abitrary imposition of men."
Learning (29)
Perception (20)
Sensation (26)
"There were philosophers who had LEARNING and subtility enough to prove. . . that White was Black."
Here Locke suggests that learning can act to manipulate language. Language is thus imperfect in the sense that learning allows it to be used to distort the truth.
"We may define the term whiteness as the power of exciting in us the sensation of white. We cannot define the name of the simple feeling itself."
Language has the power to signify a sensation, but it is powerless to truly represent that feeling. What we feel and what we use to express are, in this respect, arbitrary and futile. Language is imperfect in that true feelings and sensations cannot be captured in language. As he says in Chapter IX, "sounds have no natural connection with our ideas, but have all their signfication from the abitrary imposition of men."
The following continues Chris' discussion of Vico with an alternate take on rhetoric's relationship to inquiry:
ReplyDeleteVico indicates that “criticism is the art of true speech” (869) and that “criticism enables us to achieve truth” (870). Eloquence, however, is distinguished from criticism as the practical effort of arguing a position. This effort aids inquiry because it, first, in strengthens one’s prudence and common sense (as drawn from ars topica) and, second, enables them to apply this “fullness of personal judgment” to philosophical criticism (870). The study of a nation’s discourse reveals its cultural contribution, but not necessarily “’real’ cultural and sociological theories.” Language is a transmission of ideas, not necessarily truth. For example, the French language “can always condense into a small compass the essential meanings” and is therefore excellent for philosophy; Italian is dynamic and rich with metaphor and therefore excellent for the arts (874). In this last example we see that metaphor “prompts [the attention] to move back and forth between ideas which are far apart” and therefore demonstrates ingenuity. (874)
Vico seems ultimately interested in how knowledge is incorporated into the university. Because the provinces of knowledge have expanded greatly, the studies of arts and sciences have fractured into various schools. Vico calls for reunification under one system in harmony with both religion and politics. (876).